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A Software Patent War: The Effects of




The patent system offers a limited monopoly on inventions to
reward innovation.1 The incentive to invent is supported by patent
protections found in the U.S. Constitution-in particular, Congress's
right "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times ... the exclusive rights to their respective writings
and discoveries. "2 Patent rights are negative rights that exclude others
from the ability to make, use, or sell an invention.3 Although
intellectual property protection began with the Founding Fathers, an
inherently basic conflict continues to exist. Granting exclusive rights
through patents is essential to encourage innovation, but excluding
society from access to these ideas and inventions stifles further
innovation. The patentability of computer-implemented software is
neither a clear Constitutional protection nor explicit in patent law.
What should and should not be patentable continues to be the center
of discussion among scholars, disputing parties, and the Supreme
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2015; B.A.,
Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 2011. This note was made possible by the
support and guidance of Professor Robin Feldman, for which the author is humbly grateful. The
author also wishes to thank the editors of the Hastings Business Law Journal and Stephanie
Biehl for their editorial assistance.
1. Stuart J.H. Graham et al., Hlgh Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent Sistem:
Results of the 2008 Berkelei Patent SurveY, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1317 (2009)
(Fraham's study "show[s] that entrepreneurs have varied and subtle reasons for using the patent
system, many of which diverge from the traditional theory that patents provide an "incentive to
invent.").
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 23 (Harvard Univ. Press 2012).
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
Court.
The underlying economic principle of intellectual property is that
the process of developing innovative products is an "expensive, time-
consuming, labor-intensive, and risky endeavor."4 Once that struggle
has been overcome and the invention exists, it is inexpensive and easy
to reproduce. Startup companies have become one of the central
producers of most innovative products. They are a key source for job
creation and innovation, but the hurdle that nonpracticing entities
(i.e., entities that assert patents but do not offer products or services)
present make it difficult for emerging companies to grow.
One of the most serious concerns of patents in a startup
company's competitive environment is the threat of patent
infringement and costly litigation.5 These smaller companies are
struck by "patent trolls," a term coined by Intel's Deputy General
Counsel, Peter Detkin, in 2001 and based upon mythical creatures
that lie underneath bridges and collect tolls from unsuspecting
travelers.6 Most people use this term to refer to nonpracticing entities
("NPEs"), which are persons or businesses that do not produce or
make use of a product or service, but rather, make money from
licensing and asserting patents.7 The Bayh-Dole Act encourages
NPEs such as universities, non-profit institutions, and small
businesses to license inventions discovered with the use of federal
funds and requires that they seek patent protection. 8 Generally,
universities and non-profit organizations are not threatening with
their patents. However, the same cannot be said for other entities.
Professor Robin Feldman, along with Joshua Walker and Sara Jeruss,
have coined the term "patent monetization entity" 9 to describe
entities whose primary focus is "deriving income from licensing and
4. Graham, supra note 1, at 1259.
5. Id. at 1315.
6. Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slauing Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 673,676 (2012).
7. Jaconda Wagner, Patent Trolls and the High Cost of Litigation to Business and Start-
Ups-A Mivth:, 45 MD. B.J. 12, 14-16 (Sept. 2012).
8. See Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000-2012). See also Bd. of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (2011)
(holding that title in a patented invention vests first in the inventor, even if the inventor is a
researcher at a federally funded lab subject to the Bayh-Dole Act).
9. "Patent monetization entity" will also be referred to as "patent monetizers" or "patent
trolls."
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litigation, as opposed to making products." 0 This term distinguishes
those entities going after patent infringers for monetary purposes
from product-producing entities, which would arguably not be
classified as "patent trolls."1
Patent trolls give rise to more than sixty percent of all patent
lawsuits in the U.S., and this number only seemed to be increasing
until current Supreme Court decisions and their aftermath. Although
U.S. patent law reform has tried to regulate litigation brought by
patent trolls, permanent changes must adhere to the problems that
are faced by startup companies "bullied"1 3 by patent monetizers from
costly settlements and litigation to potentially diluting the company of
all its assets.
The effects of patent monetizers may differ depending on
whether the startup company is developing computer software and
hardware, biotechnology, or medical devices. Most biotechnology and
medical device manufacturing companies own patents. In contrast,
many emerging companies in the software industry may decide not to
patent their invention due to its cost, lack of knowledge, or belief that
the product is not patent eligible.
Research has shown that most high-technology startups prefer
to opt-out of patent protection alotgether. Some of the reasons to
opt-out are, among others, the belief that the technology is not
patentable, the cost of litigation to defend the patent against patent
trolls, and the availability of other forms of protection.1 4 Most of these
technology startups use software that, unbeknownst to them, would
be covered by a patent owned by a patent troll. The extent that this
software may be patentable remains controversial in both the
legislative and judicial branches of the government.
10. Sara Jeruss et al., The America Invents Act 509: Effects of Patent lonetization Entities
on Us Litigation, 11 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 361 (2012).
11. See generallr Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 (2008).
12. Morris Panner, Absent Patent Troll Reform, Silicon Valle 's Innovation Leadership
Could End, FORBES, Nov. 18, 2013, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/11/
18/absent-patent-troll-reform-silicon-valleys-innovation-leadership-could-end/ (according to
Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and Director of the National
Economic Council).
13. Graham et al., supra note 1, at 1315-16 ("bully" referring to patent trolls).
14. Id. at 1309.
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Regardless of the Supreme Court's decision in Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern,"5 which has spearheaded a new era of
patentability, the software patent war will not end until the legislature
has defined a bright-line rule for what is patentable pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 101. The legislature should go beyond the merits and apply
its knowledge and resources to help startups and entrepreneurs avoid
patent troll attacks and encourage innovation during rapid changes in
technology.
This note will analyze the effects of patent trolls on startup
companies and the issues that software patentability under § 101
impose on this highly controversial area of intellectual property. First,
this note will elaborate on the current patent reforms as well as the
common law struggles addressed in Supreme Court decisions. Then,
this note will discuss the software patent war and the controversial
issues raised in § 101 of the patent system followed by the issues of
patentability and its effects on startup companies. Lastly, this note
will discuss short-term and long-term progress in the patent system, as
well as address the current state of the law today. It will ultimately
conclude that, although issues of patentability and protecting
companies from patent trolls may be raised in the Supreme Court, the
solution ultimately lies in the hands of the legislature.
II. BACKGROUND
A. AMERICA INVENTS ACT RECOGNIZES EFFECTS OF PATENT
TROLLS
On September 16, 2011, President Obama signed into law the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act ("AIA").16  With the
modernization of technology, the AIA was the first major reform of
U.S. patent law to incorporate the advancements of technology in the
past sixty years. 7 Although many may argue in favor of patent trolls,
Congress found the need to control patent troll infringement suits
15. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014).
16. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
17. Bryant, supra note 6, at 680.
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through the AIA, with the prevailing view that "patent trolls deter
innovation and harm the economy."' 8
NPEs, such as product manufacturing companies and other
entities, may be harmed by litigation because they need to maintain a
reputation, avoid disruptions in their business, maintain relationships
with business partners, and avoid the risk of countersuits. On the
other hand, "patent monetizers" are less likely to be harmed by
litigation that would affect their business because their focus does not
pertain to developing or commercializing technology, but rather, their
goal is to maximize their return on investment ("ROI"). Patent trolls
fear losing losing litigation, which would result in lost profits and
diminish the efficiency of their initial investment in the patent.
Patent monetizer-initiated litigation has increased in the past
several years, and with the increase of infringement suits, Congress
has addressed its concerns about patent trolls by making it difficult
for them to file suit.19 Prior to the amendment of § 299 of the AIA20
patent-assertion entities ("PAEs"), 21 another term to describe NPEs,
attacked multiple target companies at one time (i.e., joinder suits),
asserted the same patent repeatedly, and utilized contingent-fee
attorneys such that their cost of litigation drastically decreased per
defendant and per lawsuit filed>22
Joinder suits had two advantages for patent trolls: first, they
reduced the cost of litigation by joining multiple defendants in one
suit, and second, suing multiple defendants simultaneously made it
easier to transfer the case to a more convenient venue) Amended §
299 of the AIA protects defendants that are victims of multiple
18. Bryant, supra note 6, at 680.
19. Wagner, supra note 7, at 16.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2013) ("[P]arties that are accused infringers may be joined in one
action as defendants or counterclaim defendants, or have their actions consolidated for trial"
with certain restrictions.).
21. See Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REv. 283, 292 n.54 (2011)
(citing Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Mlarketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosistem
and Its Implications for the Patent Sistem, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 299 (2010)); see also FED.
TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307
patentreport.pdf (describing PAEs as "firms whosebusiness model primarily focuses on
purchasing and asserting patents.").
22. See -enerallr Chien, supra note 21.
23. See Bryant, supra note 6, at 677.
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infringement suits.24 To file a joinder suit, the AIA requires
infringement suits to arise out of the same occurrence or transaction,
and the questions of fact must be common to all defendants named in
the complaint.-5
Among other things, the AIA also changed the system from a
"first to invent" to "first to file." -6 The new system establishes patent
priority such that, when there is more than one patent application
filed for the same invention, the patent application filed first for the
invention will be given priority. -7 The new legislation is intended to
help remove a well-funded infringer from taking advantage of
startup-owning technology (i.e., software patents). The short term
goals were to create jobs, bolster innovation, streamline the patent
system, reduce patent litigation, and maintain U.S. and global
competition. -8 Although the new patent reform still does not do much
for startup companies and these emerging companies are still affected
by the patent system, further research has been encouraged by
Congress.
Congress inserted a provision in the AIA that directed the
nonpartisan Government Accountability Office ("GAO") to conduct
a study on the "consequences of patent infringement lawsuits brought
by [NPEs].2 9 Professor Feldman and Professor Ewing, in response to
the GAO's request, provided data on NPEs over a five-year period
(2007-2011) using a database from Lex Machina. 30 This research
illustrated that within the years 2007 through 2011, lawsuits filed by
patent monetizers have increased from twenty-two percent to almost
24. See Chien, supra note 21.
25. Jeruss et al., supra note 10, at 360.
26. 35 U.S.C. § 100 (as amended by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
29, 125 Stat. 284).
27. Bryant, supra note 6, at 680.
28. Id. at 680-81 ("In an FITF system, the most important date is the objective date on
which the application was filed, and there is no requirement for corroborating evidence, as
would be needed to prove the date of invention (the determinative date under a first-to-invent
system). The FITF system takes effect on March 16, 2013.") (citing Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act sec. 3(n)).
29. Jeruss et al., supra note 10, at 364 ("NPE" refers to the effects of patent trolls in this
particular research project.).
30. Id. at 360-61. Professor Robin Feldman and Thomas Ewing conducted research
regarding patent troll litigation between 2007 and 2012. Lex Machina, formerly the Stanford IP
Clearinghouse, was founded by Mark Lemley.
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forty percent.31 Additionally, while the drastic increase in lawsuits
filed by patent trolls may seem like a red herring, the monetizers were
also heavily represented in the list of those who filed the greatest
number of lawsuits. Four out of five parties in the study sample were
monetizers .32 Furthermore, twenty percent of all high-tech patent
suits were brought by NPEs. 33
Both the White House reports and Chairwoman Edith Ramirez's
speech cite to Professor Feldman and Ewing's research. These
findings are not a new revelation but simply something that Congress
is beginning to look deeper into. As a result, many research centers
have started to gather and analyze data from the effects of patent
trolls and the patent system.
1. The Berkeley Center of Law and Technology Survey Results
The Berkeley Center of Law and Technology ("BCLT")
conducted a wide-scale survey in 2008 of high-technology startup
companies in the U.S. to determine how these companies use and are
affected by the patent system. 4 Part of the reason this survey was
conducted was to identify those aspects of the patent system that
substantially "encourage or hinder entrepreneurial activity,
particularly in high-growth technology industries such as internet,
computer software and hardware, medical device, and biotechnology
companies.,31
Substantial amounts of emerging companies opt-out of the
patent system all together. 36 Sixty-four percent of the startup
companies that were surveyed hold no patents. Among the startup
companies that were surveyed, results determined that the likelihood
31. Jeruss et al., supra note 10, at 361.
32. Id. at 361 n.19.
33. See id. at 362.
34. Graham, supra note 1, at 1255 ("We offer description and analysis of the 2008 Berkeley
Patent Survey-the first comprehensive survey of patenting and entrepreneurship in the United
States -summarizing the responses of 1,332 early-stage technology companies founded since
1998. Our results show that entrepreneurs have varied and subtle reasons for using the patent
system, many of which diverge from the traditional theory that patents provide an "incentive to
invent.").
35. Id. at 1260.
36. Id. at 1276.
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of holding (or not holding) patents, particularly by technology
startups, was not necessarily driven by age effects, but by the
company's "business model, strategy, technology, or other factors,
such as the cost of patenting and subsequent enforcement." 37 Reasons
to opt-out of patent protection include: the belief that the technology
is not patentable, the mindset that the costs of litigation and
enforcement are too high, the perception that, with reverse
engineering, patents afford relatively weak protection, the fear of
disclosure, and the availability of other forms of protection that are
less costly.38
Continuous research has shown that some startup companies opt
out of patenting products due to the belief that their technology is not
patentable; meanwhile, patent monetizers patent and later sue
companies for infringement on their patents that arguably may not be
patent-worthy. This is the argument that the Supreme Court has been
struggling with for years. The companies attacked and affected are
the startup companies that cannot afford the costly litigation attached
to this ongoing problem. Consequently, these startups usually will end
up settling and paying licensing fees.
B. COMMON LAW STRUGGLES WITH PATENTABILITY
The common theme among research is the ambiguity in patent
eligibility. The common factor whether to patent something or fight a
costly litigation boils down to patentability. While common law has
fought with the idea for many decades, the Legislature is slowly
starting to catch up with the technological advancements that were
either ignored or not foreseen when the patent system was originally
constructed.
1. Post-Bilski
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on several
controversial cases that have shaped the patent system. Recent
discussion of patentability has risen from the Supreme Court case
37. Graham, supra note 1, at 1276.
38. Id. at 1309.
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Bilski v. Kappos.39 Bilski involved an invention that explains how
buyers and sellers of commodities in the energy market can manage
risk for price changes in the industry.40 The discussion focused on the
patentability of a mathematical formula that was associated with the
steps that instructs the buyer or seller of the commodity how to hedge
risk.41 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Federal
Circuit Court, sitting en banc, rejecting the prior test used to
determine whether the invention was a patentable "process" under
the Patent Act 4-_ i.e., that a patent must be "useful, concrete, and
tangible."43The Federal Circuit concluded that the way to determine
whether an invention constitutes an unpatentable process would be to
apply the "machine-or-transformation test. 44 Under the "machine-
or-transformation test," an invention is patentable if it is "tied to a
particular machine or apparatus or it transforms a particular article
into a different state." 4 The Supreme Court rejected the "machine-
or-transformation test" as an "exhaustive and exclusive test., 46
Although this interpretation may be re-defining the term "process" in
§ 101, the Court in Bilski has also broadened the scope of
patentability in a sense.
The arguments continue through cases brought to the Supreme
Court, including the most recent case, CLS Bank Int7 v. Alice Corp.
Pty. Ltd.,47 which discussed the infringement and patentability of a
39. See generallhyBilskiv. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
40. See id. at 3220.
41. Id.
42. 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process. machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain
a patent, therefor subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
43. Bilskl 130 S. Ct. at 3218; In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affd but
criticized sub nom).
44. In re Bilsklt 545 F.3d at 956.
45. FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 116 (see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 953 (citing Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981)).
46. Bilskl 130 S. Ct. at 3236 (citing Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 70 ("[T]ransformation and
reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process
claim that does not include particular machines."). At the same time, Bilski explicitly declined
to "hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet [machine-or-transformation]
requirements." Id. at 3258; see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978) (taking a
similar approach, "assum[ing] that a valid process patent may issue even if it does not meet [the
machine-or-transformation test].").
47. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2013) cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013).
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computer system that is used to help avoid settlement risk inherent in
the trading of financial instruments. 48 The discussion in the Federal
Circuit Court surrounded the patent eligible subject matter set forth
under § 101-that processes, machines, manufacturers, and
compositions of matters are "patent eligible., 49 Although something
is "patent eligible," it does not necessarily mean that it is
"patentable." 0 The limits on patent eligibility have been established
through common law, that is, "laws of nature, natural phenomenon,
and abstract ideas."51 The argument in Alice extends to limitations
that must be placed on patentability all together with the motivation
of not hindering and preventing the exceptions going so far as to
"swallow patent law entirely."'2
While the discussions continue in the Supreme Court,
establishing a bright-line for software patentability will take more
than just common law; the legislature must step in and define
patentability. The root of patentability extends to the software that a
patent troll may patent and enforce against companies, particularly
startups. The ambiguities affect the core purpose of patent law, which
is to grant exclusive rights to an invention in order to promote
innovation and entrepreneurship. With the staggering increase in
patent litigation imposed by patent monetizers and technological
modernization being minimized by the threats of patent trolls, the
software patent war continues.
III. THE SOFTWARE PATENT WAR
A. OVERVIEW
Patent protection extends to the value the inventor places on
its invention. As a matter of public policy, the debate continues
48. Alice, 717 F.3d at 1274.
49. Id. at 1276.
50. Id. (Although a patent "may" be eligible to be patented under § 101, it ultimately
depends on whether, "in addition to presenting a patent eligible invention, the inventor also
satisfies 'the conditions and requirements of this title"' pursuant to § 102, § 103, and § 112 for
"novelty, nonobviousness, and disclosure requirements.").
51. Id. at 1276-77.
52. Id. at 1277.
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whether patentability extends to software and computer-implemented
inventions. The lack of visibility in this area of patent law undermines
an inventor's incentive to patent. Additionally, patent trolls are
asserting patents that should not be patent eligible, but are affecting
the smaller companies (i.e., startup companies) who lack the funds
and resources to raise this argument in court. While AIA introduced
interpartes review ("IPR"), a procedure to challenge the validity of
patent claims, as a counterpart to post-grant reviews, bringing such
claim in lieu of going to court would still be expensive for a startup
company.
An inventor will have an incentive to create and patent if there is
a high rate of return in an open market. Therefore, many startup
company managers argue they have less motivation to patent
software as opposed to biotechnology and medical device
companies.5 3 With a look at the statistics, not patenting would only
defend startup companies from patent troll attacks, but on the
downside, steering away from patenting only discourages innovation
and limits entrepreneurship.
There are several reasons why startup companies would opt-
out of patents, including: the belief that their product is not
patentable or outside the subject-matter scope of a patent, the cost of
litigation imposed by the high-rate of patent troll attacks, and the idea
that potential inventors put less importance on patents for software
and internet companies than biotechnology companies.
1. Software Patent Elgibility Under 35 US. C. § 101
In determining the statutory interpretation of § 101, the Supreme
Court in Bilski stated that to be protected by the Patent Act, the
claimed invention must also satisfy "the conditions and requirements
of this title,"54 that is, the requirement to be novel,55 nonobvious,56 and
fully and particularly described. The Court continued to hold that
53. Mark A. Lemley, Properti. Intellectual Propertji and Free Riding, 83 TEx. L. REV.
1031, 1054 (2005) ("To profit from a new idea or a work of authorship .....
54. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 1(P2 (1952).
56. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1952).
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the concept of hedging reduced to a mathematical formula is an
abstract idea, and allowing such a patent would "pre-empt use of this
approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an
abstract idea."' 8 The Court left open the discussion of software
patents although the Court later affirmed, in Mayo Collaborative
Services. v. Prometheus Laboratories., Inc., that the "[p]henomena of
nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of
scientific and technological work."' 9 It continued to reason that yet
again monopolization of these "abstract ideas" by granting patents
would "impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it."6
Arguably, software patents may fall into this gray area of "abstract
ideas." The implications caused by granting patents on software may
monopolize the scientific and technological work, and in return affect
innovation.
These Supreme Court cases have shown that in order to change
the patent system, the Supreme Court must "change its prevailing
view of what a patent is.",61 While the Patent Act defines the scope of
patentable "subject-matter" in 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that laws of nature, abstract ideas, and natural
phenomenon cannot be patented.' The Supreme Court
interpretation of a patent extends further than Bilski and Prometheus
Laboratories-two cases decided in 2013 that were recently granted
certiorari and have been influential in the long race to an answer.
In the most recent case, Association for Molecular Pathology, et
aL. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the Supreme Court affirmed that, with
respect to § 101 of the Patent Act, the "laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas" lie beyond the domain of patent
protection.63 Myriad Genetics, Inc. ("Myriad ") obtained patents on
the discovery of the precise location and sequence of genetic
58. BilsKl 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
59. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (citing
Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67).
60. Id. at 1293.
61. Robin Feldman, You patentedit, you oifn it? Not sofast, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20,
2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/01/20/vou-patented-you-own-not-fast/lSff9wz0Tw
jfgOUzZJ3OBK/story.html.
62. See generally Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. 1289.
63. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2109 (2013).
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mutations associated with certain forms of breast and ovarian cancer
as well as patents on the methods of testing associated with those
mutations and researching treatment.64 The Court held that the
naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and
therefore, not patentable because it was not isolated, but the
composite DNA -synthetically created exons-only strands of
nucleotides-is patentable because DNA was extracted from the cells
to isolate specific segments for study, and it is not considered a
naturally occurring phenomena.6"
The idea of patentability depends on whether the invention is
new "with markedly different characteristics from any found in
nature and one having the potential for significant utility., 66 In
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court decided whether the
patent of a "human-made, genetically engineered bacterium capable
of breaking down crude oil" was a valid non-natural invention. 67 It
held that the bacterium was a "nonnaturally occurring manufacture
or composition of matter" that is patentable subject matter under §
101.68 On the other hand, the Court found, in FunktBrothers Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., that the composition of bacteria to create a
single inoculant was not patent eligible because the patent holder did
not alter the bacteria as it did in Chakrabarty.69
The Court has come closer than ever to creating a visible line for
what may be considered patent eligible under § 101, but the gray
areas still remain. It continued to argue that even if an invention is
"groundbreaking, innovative, or even [a] brilliant discovery" it may
not by itself satisfy § 101.'°  It has better defined what may constitute
an "abstract idea" and a "natural phenomena," but applying this to
other patentable products, such as software, is more difficult and
remains as a bigger challenge in developing and interpreting the
patent system.
64. lIriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2109.
65. Id.
66. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 310.
67. Id. at 303.
68. Id.
69. See -enerall Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
70. MiPriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2110 (citing FunkBros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. 127).
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B. A MONOPOLISTIC FIGHT: SOFTWARE PATENTS NOT
PATENTABLE'?
How much monopolistic competition should be granted to
software patents compared to other patents'? Patent law restricts
competition by allowing exclusive rights to sell, manufacture, and
invent; therefore, the broader the scope of intellectual property
rights, the less new innovators will develop and market new products
and inventions.1
The argument continues: exclusive rights granted through
patents are necessary to encourage innovation while excluding society
from new ideas and inventions may be putting a damper on the
incentive to invent. One of the main reasons startup companies opt
out of patents is because they believe their product is not
patentable. 72 Under § 101 of the Patent Act, a software must be
considered a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement,"7 3 such
that they are not laws of nature, abstract ideas, or natural
phenomenon.74
1. Drawing the Line
Before determining whether a software patent falls under the
"subject-matter" as defined in the Patent Act, one must understand
and interpret what a software patent entails. A software patent may
be a patent on the performance of a computer through some form of
technical programming, but even this definition is vague.
Section 18 of the AIA of 2011 along with recent Supreme Court
decisions have made efforts to restrict certain types of software
patents." Following the Supreme Court's rejection of having a
71. Afiriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 1057.
72. See general Graham, supra note 1.
73. Supra note 54.
74. See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293.
75. Supra note 16 (section 18(d) states that "For purposes of this section, the term 'covered
business method patent' means a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for
performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or
management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for
technological inventions.").
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"useful, concrete, and tangible" result to determine patentability,
Federal Circuit decisions have found many software products
unpatentable.76 Some ineligible patents included a method for
detecting fraud in a credit card transaction over the Internet, which
consisted of unpatentable mental steps falling under the category of
"abstract ideas,"77  and a "computer-implemented method for
processing car loan applications," 8 such that they did not apply
concrete steps that required extensive computer interface. More
unpatentable abstract ideas included computer related financial
claims7 9 as well as a real estate business technique designed to
produce certain tax savings.80
a. Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International et al.
Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States published its
opinion in Alice, a case that received a lot of media and attention, but
did not receive the visibility that most would have expected. The
Court applied a two-part patent eligibility analysis established in
Mayo (i.e., "Alice Standard"). First, the court wanted to determine
whether the claims were not patent eligible such that the claims were
drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement.81 Second, the
Court decided whether the abstract idea contained an "inventive
concept" to transform the claim into patentable subject matter1 '- To
apply the § 101 exception, the distinction was made between patents
that "claim the 'building block' of human ingenuity" from those
patents that "integrate blocks into something more" and transform
the product into a patentable invention 3 The patent at issue was a
computer-implemented method for mitigating "settlement risk," such
that the program was designed "to facilitate the exchange of financial
76. Colleen V. Chien, ReformingSoftuare Patents, 50 Hous. L. REV. 325,348 (2012).
77. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
78. See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
79. See Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1269
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
80. See Fort Properties, Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
81. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1303).
82. Id. at 2357.
83. Id. at 2350 (citing Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1303).
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obligations between two parties by using a computer system as a third
party intermediary. "4
An abstract idea encompasses the longstanding rule that "[a]n
idea of itself is not patentable."8' The Court in Gottschalk v. Benson
determined that an algorithm for converting binary-coded decimal
numbers into pure binary form was not patent eligible because it was
an idea of itself and nothing more.86 Similar to the invention in
Gottschalk and the computer-implemented method for mitigating
financial risk against price fluctuations in Bilski, the Court in Alice
stated that the use of third party intermediary is a "building block of
the modern economy," and therefore, an abstract idea.'
The Court then moved onto the second step in the Mayo
framework. An invention that is a "fundamental economic practice"
is an abstract idea, but the claims may still be patent eligible if that
method can be applied to a "new and useful end."88 Implementing the
mathematical formula on a computer, or any tangible system for that
matter does not make it patentable under § 101;89 one cannot state an
abstract idea and simply add the words "apply it. " 90
The Court determined that the computer-implemented
mathematical method was an abstract idea and did not add anything
that was not already present when the steps were considered
separately. 9 The concept of patentability for computer-implemented
software extended to the policy issues raised in the patent system.
Monopolizing abstract ideas impedes rather than promotes
innovation and preempts use of these generic computer
implementations in all fields. While Alice was an important case that
has helped direct software patentability, it has still failed to define it.
Currently the Court has demonstrated an interpretation of the patent
system that leans toward the European patent system, which is the
understanding that an abstract idea is patent eligible when it provides
84. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352.
85. Id. at 2350 (citing Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2350.
88. Id. at 2354.
89. Id. at 2358.
90. Id. at 2359.
91. Id.
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a technical contribution.
2. European Patent Law
In Europe, a program for a computer is not patentable if it does
not have the potential to cause a "further technical effect"' beyond
the inherent technical interaction between hardware and software. It
would be inaccurate to say that the European Patent Office ("EPO")
does not grant software patents because it has granted more than
thirty thousand software patents in the past thirty years.9 3 The patents
were specifically for "computer-implemented inventions." Article 52
of the European Patent Convention ("EPC") states that a European
patent "shall" be granted for all technological inventions "provided
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of
industrial application., 94 Article 52(2) defines the terms that make a
product not patentable. Non-patent eligible subject matter includes
"discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods," as well
as aesthetic creations and programs for computers.9 5 Furthermore, the
EPC goes on to define an "inventive step" as an invention that is "not
obvious to a person skilled in the art. ,96
Similar to the United States, the European patent system
demonstrates that an invention is patentable subject matter when it is
not an abstract idea and has a "technical character." 97 Although
computer-implemented programs may be restricted under Article
52(2), the EPC may not exclude the patent if it has a technical
character (i.e., "instruction, addressed to a technically skilled person
as to how to solve a particular technical program in a particular
92. Patents for Software? European Law and Practice, EUR. PAT. OFF., http://www.
epo.org/news-issues/issues/software.html (last updated Nov. 26, 2013).
93. Roy J. Rosser, European Softiw are Patent Rejection Not A Rejection, 236 N.J. LAW. 36,
36 (2005).
94. Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52(l), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S.
199, 271 [hereinafter EPC].
95. EPC art. 52(2), supra note 94, at 271-72 ("The following in particular shall not be
regarded as inventions within the meaning of paragraph 1 [52(l)] (a) discoveries, scientific
theories and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for
performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers; (d)
presentations of information.").
96. EPC art. 56, supra note 94, at 273.
97. Id.
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technical means"). 98 Additionally, recent case law in Europe has
demonstrated that software-related claims may still be patent eligible
if they "contain physical hardware features." 99 While the EPC
emphasizes the physicality of the invention, it has been argued that
the U.S. Congress intended statutory subject matter under § 101 to
"include anything under the sun that is made by man." 100
Although U.S. patent law does not digress far from the
regulations of the EPC, uncertainty is a recurring theme in software
patentability. A study conducted by Catherine E. Tucker suggested
that there is a correlation between patents granted in the U.S. and the
amount of patent litigation.01 In order to decrease the high volume of
litigation, the U.S. must decrease the amount of patents it grants. It
may do this by increasing the threshold for patentability. The
research continues to demonstrate that patents in Europe as well as
Japan must meet a higher threshold for innovation. 0 2 Tucker defined
"triadic patents" as patents that have been approved by the United
States Patent Office ("USPTO"), the EPO, as well as the Japanese
Patent Office ("JPO"). 03 Triadic patents are considered to be of
"higher quality" because they are approved under more stringent
requirements.10 4 The study continued to demonstrate that patent
litigation decreases with the percentage of triadic patents,10 s but there
is a caveat. Even with triadic patents, pharmaceutical patents are
more likely to be triadic than technology patents; therefore, a higher
percentage of technology patents will continue to face litigation.0 6
It is evident that applying stringent requirements and evaluations
to patents benefit most patents but there remains a fuzzy threshold
for software patentability not only in the U.S. but all over the world.
98. EPC art. 56, supra note 94, at 273.
99. Kevin Afghani & Duke W. Yee, Keeping It Physical: Convergence on a Phisicalitr
Requirement for Patentabilitr of Software-Related Inventions Under the European Patent
Convention and United States La if, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 239, 242 (2008).
100. Id. at 257 (citing Diamond, 447 U.S. at 310).
101. Catherine Tucker, The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities on
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Patents are meant to encourage innovation and monopolize an
invention that is new and useful, but the uses of computer-
implemented programs are widely used in all fields of technology,
making the threshold for patentability more challenging.
IV. STARTUP COMPANIES TAKE THE HIT
The "Software Patent War" has kept many wondering when a
patent infringement lawsuit on a software patent is valid under the
patent system. Patent trolls target a diverse set of companies, but the
ones that seem to be most affected both financially and economically
are startups in the high-tech industry. Most vulnerable to attacks,
startup companies are the focus of litigation in the world of patent
monetizers. They go after these emerging companies that lack the
budget and resources to litigate, may not have patents themselves,
and are the source of potentially thousands of new jobs for the
economy.
In a recent patent lawsuit, Ditto, a virtual eyewear startup which
allows customers to virtually "try" on glasses without physically trying
them on, was sued by Wellpoint, owners of 1-800-Contacts and
Glasses.com for patent infringement.0 7 At that time, Ditto was in the
process of receiving additional funding to expand the business. Kate
Doerksen, the founder of the startup, knew that litigation costs were
going to be expensive, but when she tried to sell the company, buyers
valued her startup three to four million dollars less than it would cost
prior to litigation. 08 Consequently, the startup had to lay off four of
its fifteen employees to pay for legal expenses. 09 As a result, Ditto
joined forces with a patent troll, IPNav, whose founder, Erich
Spangenberg, agreed to help fight and pay legal expenses in exchange
for equity in Ditto.10 Even if a patent monetizer is not attacking a
startup company through lawsuit, patent trolls find other avenues to
expand their patent portfolio.
107. Marcus Wohlson, Patent Trolls Are I lling Startups-Except When They're Saving




110. Id. (IPNav is known to be "the most notorious patent troll in America.").
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The increase of patent troll attacks has created an entry barrier
for startup companies. Venture capitalists refrain from funding
companies with impending lawsuits with the fear that there will be
high costs of litigation and possible dilution.
A. COST OF LITIGATION
Patent monetizers assert patents knowing startup companies
lack the budget and resources to litigate and may even attack the
company at a vulnerable stage-for instance, "on the eve of a funding
or acquisition event" or directly to their customers.111 While most
biotechnology companies have claimed that the most important
reason they decided not to pursue a patent on an invention was
because they were reluctant to disclose information, startup
companies claimed the cost of patent prosecution was too high.1
Acquiring a patent costs an average of thirty-eight thousand dollars1 3
while prosecuting a patent may cost even more, including potential
loss of the company.
It is often difficult to know what a patent covers, regularly
costing millions of dollars in attorney's fees to find out; therefore,
"when a patent holder knocks on a door a rational company may
choose to settle, even if the patent is weak or doesn't apply to the
product. 1 1 4 Many times the patent that is being asserted may not
even be valid, but just proving the validity of a patent is also very
costly (i.e., interpartes review).
This conflict extends far beyond the "smartphone wars," '1 a
never-ending chain of lawsuits and countersuits on patents and
trademarks among smartphone competitors. Patent monetizers send
out letters to small companies and demand licensing fees for use of
common, everyday office equipment, such as scanning and emailing
111. Colleen V. Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation 4 (Santa Clara U. Sch. of L.,
Accepted Paper No. 26-13, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract
id-2321340.
112. Graham, supra note 1, at 1311.
113. Id.
114. Robin Feldman, FTC lust Alove (uickl A gainst Patent Trolls, S.F. CHRON., July 19,
2013, http://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/FTC-must-move-quickly-against-patent-trolls-
4676067.php?t=034c36337dcefdcb88.
115. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Flees. Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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documents. For example, the owner of BlueWave Computing, an IT
services provider, received a demand letter inquiring that he had to
pay $1,000 per employee to license a patent. 116 The patent claims the
process for using an office scanner to scan and email a PDF
document. 7 Unlike many other business owners, he decided to fight
back and was victorious, but these patents have not gone away.1 The
patent holder, Project Paperless, has been asserting its patents
through several other shell companies and sending out the same
demand letter to small businesses and requesting payments from $900
to $1,200 per employee.119
Startup companies and smaller businesses do not have the know-
how regarding the patents that exist, and they have little choice but to
pay the licensing fees to avoid time-consuming and costly litigation;
even the cost of due diligence on the patents may be a cost-sensitive
matter. The scarce resources and vulnerability make these small
companies "sitting ducks."'1 0
B. VC INVESTMENT AND FINANCING
The cost of litigation not only impacts the well-being of the
company, but it hinders its ability to grow. Emerging companies in all
industries (high-tech, biotechnology, as well as medical device
companies) have a need for funding. Although most startup
companies will seek funding from angel investors, who play a passive
role in the company, large amounts of money flow into successful
startups through venture capital ("VC") investments.
Securing investments and financing may be a key asset for the
well-being of a company, especially in its early stages. Patents play a
significant role in increasing RO, as well as maintaining competitive
prices, and licensing to generate profits. Patents are considered
116. Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Rant $1,000-for Usinbg Scanners, ARS TECHNICA (Jan.




120. Colleen V. Chien, Startups andPatent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 461 (forthcoming
2014) ("sitting duck" refers to someone or something that is vulnerable to attack. It alludes to
ducks that float on the surface of the water without suspecting that is the object of a predator).
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valuable "hard assets" that can help secure loans, increase a
company's value upon liquidation, and affect the firm's overall
success."l 1 All these factors are taken into consideration along with
the potential litigation when a venture capitalist considers funding an
emerging company. Although patents play a key role in funding,
many surveyed venture capitals view patenting for software and
Internet companies less important than biotechnology companies.'
While many VCs seem less impacted by startups without
software patents, surveys have shown that they have nevertheless
been greatly affected by patent monetizers. Surveys show that nearly
ninty percent of all technology VC investments have been impacted
by patent troll demands.1 23 About forty percent of the time, the
demand was a result of the startup's adoption of another's
technology.1 24 This may include the "smart phone wars" as well as
predators such as Project Paperless who assert patents on everyday
office equipment use. This once again demonstrates that simple
patent schemes allow patent trolls to monopolize the patent system
and potentially cost startup companies their endeavors and life
savings.
C. STARTUP COMPANIES AND THEIR EFFECT ON BOLSTERING TtE
ECONOMY: TIHE CHILLING EFFECT
Regardless of the decisions startup companies make with
regards to software patent, the vagueness of the patent system-
combined with small companies' lack of understanding of the
system-not only affects these emerging companies, but also affects
the entire economy on a larger scale. A dataset compiled by the U.S.
government called Business Dynamics Statistics ("BDS") shows that
firms within their first year of existence (i.e., startup companies) add
an average of three million jobs per year, but this could change
rapidly.
Patent troll attacks have a chilling effect on innovation. Many
121. Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, !hihv Do Start-Ups Patent, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1063, 1078 (2008).
122. Id.
123. Chien, supra note 111.
124. Id.
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survey respondents claim that they try to avoid any attack by using
open source software or even limit their companies to United
Kingdom and European markets. Staying in the U.S. market "is a
when, not if question" regarding the threat of patent litigation. '25 This
only discourages many companies from flourishing in the U.S. and
bolsters economies of countries overseas.
In a case study, a flight simulator program called X-Plane which
has been widely used by NASA, the Federal Aviation
Administration, and Boeing, was available on the Android operation
system for a small fee. Austin Meyer, the founder of X-Plane, was
sued by Uniloc for using "Google-provided copy-protection
software. 1 26 The litigation greatly impacted X-Plane's plans for
further innovation. In an attempt to secure their business, the startup
was "forced to abandon product updates and new products that were
in development" with the intent to avoid further litigation.27 Uniloc
continues to sue smaller companies for infringement on its patents. In
2013, Uniloc also sued Rackspace Hosting, Inc. for infringement on
its patent, but the U.S. District Court for Eastern Texas stated that a
"formula to 'solve mathematical problems of converting one form of
numerical representation to another"' was not patentable under §
101. 8 The District Court analyzed patent eligibility using Bilskis
"machine-or-transformation test" and analogized the mathematical
formula to the general method for converting numbers between
different representations in Benson. -9 Unlike X-Plane, Rackspace
was a larger company with the money and resources to fight a
patentability claim and dismiss the case.
Companies are being discouraged from innovation because of
125. Chien, supra note 120, at 477 ("Among those who had not received a demand, some
reported significant impacts from watching others receive them. Numerous respondents who
had not received a demand said they used open source software in order to avoid liability.
Others reported being very conscious of patent threats. Said one small software company, for
example: '[w]e have limited ourselves to the UK & European markets, simply because the mere
threat of Patent Litigation if we enter the US market, is a WHEN not IF question.' Another
said J used to develop software for retail and on spec for publishing by other companies. But
we've quit that because the risk of patent litigation."')
126. Tucker, supra note 101.
127. Id.
128. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Rackspace Hosting, Inc., No. 12-CV-375, 2013 WL 7393173, at
*4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2013); see also Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 93.
129. Id. at *2-3.
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the threat of litigation and small companies, unlike Rackspace, are
not able to fight software-patent wars due to all the severe
implications. In a survey conducted by Colleen Chien, with a pool of
seventy-nine companies, results demonstrated that twenty-two
percent of the respondents that received a demand did not do
anything, while thirty-five percent fought the demand, and eighteen
percent settled.130 Although many startup companies may refrain
from even responding to a demand letter, forty percent of those small
businesses that do respond have reported a "significant operational
impact., 13 A significant operational impact includes: delayed hiring
or achievement of another milestone, change in the product, a pivot
in business strategy, a shut-down business line or possibly the entire
business, and/or loss of valuation of the company.
Chien's research also illustrates that forty percent of the
respondents were being targeted because of their "use of another's or
a widely available technology.",132 The patent assertions raised by
patent monetizers include technology people use on a daily basis such
as patents related to scanning, having Wi-Fi on the premises of their
business, or even the everyday online transactions that use a digital
shopping cart.
In common litigation asserted by patent trolls, Innovatio IP
Ventures, LLC ("Innovatio") is a patent monetizer known to assert
patent infringement suits targeting small companies. In 2011,
Innovatio had sent more than eight thousand letters to end-users of
Wi-Fi technology (i.e., "targets"), demanding them to pay license
fees. 1 33 Instead of targeting the manufacturers of the infringing device,
Innovatio has been targeting the end-users such as "bakeries,
restaurants, cafes, hotels and other small businesses" that only use the
device but are not involved with the sale or manufacturing of the
130. See Uniloc USA, 2013 WL 7393173, at *2 ("Around 60% of the demands during this
period [2006 to present] involved software or high-tech patents.").
131. Chien, supra note 122, at 465 ("The characteristics of small companies can make it
harder to absorb a PAE demand - forty percent of small companies that received a demand and
responded to the survey (N-79) reported a 'significant operational impact': delayed hiring or
achievement of another milestone, change in the product, a pivot in business strategy, a shut-
down business line or the entire business, and/or lost valuation .. .
132. Id.
133. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Liti-, 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
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infringed device.134 These small businesses are unaware that their
everyday use of Wi-Fi may be infringing on a patent. Yet, patent
monetizers, such as Innovatio, prefer to target small businesses and
startups rather than the large manufacturing companies that may be
able to retaliate.
Some inventions that one would not believe to be patentable
pass muster in the USPTO like Amazon's "one-click" patent. 13' These
nuances place startup companies in danger of patent troll attacks.
Without the finances nor the knowledge, honest mistakes can lead to
costly litigation and may shut down their company all together,
leaving many jobless and hopeless. In the words of a well renowned
economist, Joseph Schumpeter, "Small company innovation plays a
crucial role in the success and dynamism of capitalist economies."
V. PROPOSAL
The impact of patent assertions on startups and small
companies alike has caused great harm. The effect of high litigation
cost ranges from the loss of jobs to companies shutting down, as well
as negatively affecting innovation and entrepreneurship. Patent trolls
are a growing and recognizable threat to companies and innovation.
Although Congress has taken measures to incorporate the harms of
patent trolls through legislation, patent reform is only a temporary
solution. There are several solutions that may be considered. One
very controversial yet increasingly popular idea is "abolishing"
software patents. As discussed earlier, there are many gray areas
associated with software patentability; therefore, abolishing software
patents may be less attractive in the short term. Alternatively, cases
currently argued in the Supreme Court and legislative activity will
affect the patent system and may help define software patentability.
Ultimately it will be in the hands of Congress to adopt a standard of
patent eligibility to reduce patent troll litigation and patentability
suits raised in the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, patent reform and
better defense tactics may help ameliorate the harms caused by
134. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 907.
135. Chien, supra note 111 (Amazon's "one-click" patent is "a single-action ordering
component.., in response to performance of only a single action.").
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patent monetization entities.
A. PATENT REFORM: A TEMPORARY RELIEF IN THE SHORT-TERM,
DEFINING PATENTABILITY IN THE LONG-TERM
Legislation has made recent efforts to recognize the harms
caused by patent monetization entities, but patent reform has done
more for older and well-established companies than it has for new
startups. The AIA tried to make it more difficult for patent trolls to
file lawsuits through the limitation of joinder suits136 as well as
incorporated a grace period to determine validity of a patent in its
"prior art" provision of § 102.137
Current patent reform is only a temporary relief and does little
for startup companies. Startup companies are cash-poor while patent
litigation is expensive. Such reform may help deter suits being
brought but that does not stop threats of litigation aimed towards
smaller companies. A demand letter may threaten a new startup
company and cost them large sums of money for licensing or just
responding to the demand.
Playing the devil's advocate, the patent system allows
monetizers to initiate their rights granted to them. Section 271 of the
Patent Law states that "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers
to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the U.S., or imports
into the U.S. any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefore, infringes the patent., 138 If the patent system allows patent
trolls to pursue litigation against those entities infringing the patents
they own, they are just enforcing the laws Congress created.
However, the argument goes beyond whether patent trolls should be
enforcing the law and suing the infringers. Patent trolls are
"monetizers" and they profit from asserting patents. The way to
prevent or limit the litigation imposed on startups is by clearing the
136. Supra note 20 (Joinder suits are only available in patent litigation if the parties are
jointly or severally liable for the infringements rising out of the same transaction or occurrence,
and there are common questions of fact.).
137. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2011) (The priority date for determining whether the patent is valid is
the date of conception of the invention rather than the date of filing the patent. This gives
patentees the ability to delay patenting for a few years.).
138. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2013).
Vol. 11:1
A SOFTWARE PATENT WAR
blurred thresholds for software patentability.
Amending the patent system to limit joinder suits and
incorporating the prior art provision does not help startup companies
that lack an understanding of the patent system, are cash-poor, and
are many times infringing a patent that probably should not exist (i.e.,
software patents). In order to effect long-term change, Congress
needs to define software patentability under § 101. Defining the
patentability of computer-implemented software and patent eligibility
in general needs more than vague language incorporated in patent
law. Rather, ideas similar to the European Patent System must be
used to influence the limitations that are drawn. These limitations
start with the physicality of the subject matter.
Currently, case law such as Alice has helped solidify the notion
that an "abstract idea" pursuant to § 101 is not patent eligible. The
Supreme Court continues to uphold the test discussed in Mayo that
the invention must do more than "apply it," it must add some value.
This is similar to what the EPA and JPA have been practicing for
several years. Although they have not defined software-patentability
themselves, they have acknowledged the effects this issue raises in a
new era of innovation and entrepreneurship. Both the EPA and JPA
have incorporated this legal issue in their patent system-which the
USPTO has undoubtedly been struggling with.
When the Founding Fathers drafted the Constitution, they were
unaware that technological advancements would redefine the laws of
the nation. Now, technology has gone beyond the tangible devices
and has evolved into computer-implemented algorithms incorporated
in undefined space. Should this be patentable'? What is being
patented'? These are questions members of Congress should be asking
themselves. They should draw a line at physicality or at the complex
algorithm used to create that undefined space, but it must go well
beyond the discussion raised in the Supreme Court. With the
exponential increase in the technology industry, computer-
implemented software patentability is an issue forced into legal
conversations, and hence, must be acknowledged as a pressing issue.
B. ELIMINATING SOFTWARE PATENTS: A GOOD IDEA'?
Many entrepreneurs in the software industry believe that
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patenting is a "gigantic waste of time and money., 139 Recent case law
has demonstrated that in order to determine patentability of software,
it is important to understand the scope of § 101. The decision in Bilski
was the start of discussion about the abstract ideas limitation on
patentable subject matter, but what that actually entails still remains a
mystery. Putting limitations on patentability protects innovation and
supports the current trend of diminishing patent troll litigation. It
may seem as though eliminating software patenting would eliminate
the problem, but instead that would be avoiding the rooted issue. The
question is not whether software patents should exist, but rather
whether eliminating software patenting would eliminate patent troll
attacks on startup companies, and whether they are abstract ideas
that fall outside the scope of a patentable subject matter under § 101.
Abolishing software patents removes overly abstract ideas
from patentable subject matter, as distinguished in § 112. Professor
Mark Lemley appropriately states that, "by moving patenting
downstream, we both permit competition in research and
development and encourage competition among the practical, applied
inventions developed by that research. ,140 Therefore, whether
legislatures eliminate software patents or define a software patent
and apply restrictions to its patentability, it would be "stimulating
optimal invention. 1 41
Patent trolls attack startup companies that infringe software
patents, but because of the lack of patent subject-matter definiteness,
a startup company will not know whether they are infringing a patent
or whether an invention is patent-worthy. The U.S. may consider
adopting provisions that are imposed by the EPC, such that they
continue to grant software patents but they restrict patentability to
inventions that are "new, and ha[ve] an inventive step and industrial
applicability."' 42 Granting a limited monopoly on an invention was
designed to encourage innovation, rather than be asserted to threaten
companies and essentially put new and emerging companies out of
business. Therefore, abolishing software patents would devalue both
139. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2013).
140. Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilskl 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1331 (2011).
141. Id.
142. See Rosser, supra note 95.
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the patent system all together and all patent-using entities.
C. WHERE Do THE GOVERNMENT, THE COURTS, AND THE PEOPLE
STAND TODAY'?
While the patent wars continue in both the judicial and
legislative branches of government, the question of software
patentability remains the most controversial topic of them all. The
most current case argued in the Supreme Court, Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank International, and Congress' acceptance of the effect of patent
troll litigation have opened Pandora's box to discussion among
scholars and entrepreneurs alike. It is not simply what is patent
eligible under § 101 but rather, what constitutes a software patent
altogether.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Alice, many scholars
had expressed their thoughts and concerns regarding the decisions of
the Supreme Court through their written amicus briefs. Some people
have raised the issue of software patentability promulgated in Mayo,
such that patent eligibility should not "depend simply on the
draftsman's art. "1 43 A distinguished professor at the Univeristy of
California, Hastings College of the Law, Robin Feldman, explains in
her amicus brief that patents may be divided into two types: "product
and process patents., 144 Product patents are "granted on [a] particular
device or machine, while process patents are granted on a method of
doing something. 1 4S Software patents are a hybrid of both process
and product patents. Professor Feldman continues to argue that
software patents may be held to the same standards of patenting for
all kinds of patents if there is a cohesive understanding of patentable
subject matter through the concepts of "preemption and specific
commercial application."1 46 The idea is to define a software patent
such that it does not fall under the concept of "abstract ideas."
Further arguments have been raised by organizations affected
143. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
144. Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Robin Feldman and the U.C. Hastings Institute for
Innovation Law on Behalf of Neither Party, Alice, 717 F.3d at 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013).
145. Id. at 15.
146. Id. at 36.
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by the lack of definitiveness in the language of the statute and the
open door to patent troll litigation. The National Venture Capital
Association ("NVCA") drafted a letter to the Senate Judicial
Committee expressing its concerns with patent reform. The NVCA
voiced concern in regards to weak patent reform that deter venture
capitalists from investing in emerging companies due to what they
called "abusive practices" (referring to patent troll litigation). 147 The
organization went into detail regarding shifting fees and costs, joinder
suits, as well as extending the Covered Business Method ("CBM")
procedure, which is a method of review for all "software" patents.
The problem with CBM goes back to the rooted issue about defining
a software patent and its patentability. The problems have extended
to investors who fund startup companies. Without the funding of
VCs, many emerging companies would be nonexistent. In the words
of the President and CEO of NVCA, VCs work closely with
"entrepreneurs to transform breakthrough ideas into emerging
growth companies that drive U.S. job creation and economic
growth. "148
The Supreme Court changed the landscape of patent law in
Alice, not because it established common law to define patentability,
but rather because it shed light on the importance of raising the issue
of software patent eligibility pursuant to § 101. Now, courts have
adopted the "Alice Standard" and have become more hostile than
ever before.
1. Post-Alice Ramifications
The USPTO was infamous for approving the "do it on a
computer" 149 patent in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These are the
exact type of patents that the Supreme Court invalidated in Alice. A
147. Letter from the National Venture Capital Association to the Senate Judicial Committee
(Mar. 31, 2014) (on file with the NVCA Public Policy).
148. Id.
149. Timothy B. Lee, Software Patents Are Crumbling, Thanks to the Supreme Court, Vox
(Sept. 12, 2014, 3:50 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/9/12/6138483/software-patents-are-
crumbling-thanks-to-the-supreme-court ("These patents take some activity that people have
been doing for centuries ... and claim the concept of performing that task with a computer or
over the internet.").
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patent that converts a task into a computer-implemented software is
an abstract idea and hence, not patent eligible under § 101. Alice is
the first case in thirty-three years to be decided in the Supreme Court
on software patentability. The decision has made courts more
aggressive towards this issue. Lower courts have ruled on almost a
dozen software patentability cases since the Supreme Court decision,
invalidating and rejecting every single one.5 0
Just a few weeks after the Supreme Court published its decision,
a Delaware trial court rejected a Comcast patent that determined
when a new connection was available through a computer-
implemented telecommunication.51 The trial court claimed this was a
system that could be performed by a person making telephone calls
and the computerized system did not add anything new and useful. -"
Ten days later, the Federal Circuit Appeals Court-which is the
leading court in patent law and has liberalized access to patents in the
area of technology -rejected a patent for a device profile and a
method for creating a device profile within a digital image processing
system.1 3 The Federal Circuit found the software patent to be overly
abstract, stating, "Without additional limitations a process that
employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information
to generate additional information is not patent eligible. 1 4 The
Federal Circuit followed this decision with another case where it once
again rejected a patent on a system that runs a bingo game on a
computer, arguing that converting a process into computerized
software does not make an invention patent eligible.55
150. The Supreme Court made its decision on June 19, 2014 and these statistics are updated
through September 17, 2014. Almost three months after the decision, and courts have drastically
relied on the decision in Alice to invalidate "do it on a computer" patents and reject other
disputed patents brought to judicial attention.
151. Comcast IP Holdings I, LLC v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., No. CV 12-205-RGA, 2014 WL
3542055 (D. Del. July 16, 2014); see also Pilar G. Kraman, Judge Andre ws Invalidates Comcast
Patent for Lack of Patentable Subject Matter under 35 U.S.C. §101, DEL. IP . BLOG (July
2014), http://www.delawareiplaw.com/2014/07/judge-andrews-finds-comcast-patent-invalid-lack-
patentable-subj ect-matter-35 -u-s-c- C2 A7-101.html.
152. Id.
153. See Digitech Image Tech., LLC v. Flec. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
154. Id. at 1351.
155. See Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, No. 2013-1663, 2014 WL 4195188 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
26, 2014).
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Within three months, courts have invalidated patents for
computer-implemented instructions created to individualize meal
plans, achieve dieting goals,5 6 link a mortgage line of credit to a
checking account,5 7 and control the release of information to
establish anonymous communications. 18 Courts also invalidated
patents involving a computerized method to "upsell" offers generated
from initial transactions,5 9 as well as a process for rounding to dollars
and subtracting amounts from each payment to set collected small
amounts in a larger pool. 160 These are a few of several other patents
that were invalidated or struck down just weeks after Alice.161 All
these courts cited to Alice and the two-step test that would determine
patent eligibility. The lower courts as well as the Federal Circuit
Appeals Court argued that these patents were no different if the
methods were performed by a human mind. These were abstract
ideas that only transferred a process conducted by a human into
software-implemented instructions performed by a computer.
The Supreme Court has not only established a new two-part test
in Alice, it has spearheaded a shift in software patentability. The
USPTO has been withdrawing notices of allowance after issue fees
have been collected and calling them "Alice rejections. ' 62Although
156. See DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, No. 13 CIV. 8391 PAE, 2014 WL
3582914 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 8, 2014).
157. See CMG Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Trust Bank, F.S.B., No. 2:11-CV-10344, (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 29, 2014).
158. See Walker Digital, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. CV 11-318-LPS, 2014 WL 4365245 (D.
Del. Sept. 3, 2014).
159. See Tuxis Tech., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. CV 13-1771-RGA, 2014 WL 4382446
(D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014).
160. See Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 8:ll-CV-2826-T-23TBM,
2014 WL 4540319 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2014).
161. See also Loyalty Conversion Sys. Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2:13-CV-655, 2014 WL
4364848 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2014) (Texas trial court invalidated patent on the concept of
converting loyalty rewards from one entity using another using a computerized system.);
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2013-1575, 2014 WL 4337771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 3, 2014) (Federal
Circuit Appeals Court struck down patent that claimed a method for providing commercial
arrangement through the computer and a network); Eclipse IP LLC, v. McKinley Equip. Corp.,
No. SACV 14-742-GW(AJWx), 2014 WL 4407592 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014) (California trial
court rejected a patent on a computerized system that created a notification communication
pursuant to a task).
162. Gene Quinn, Examiners Begin Issuing Alice Rejections for Software, IPWATCHDOG
(July 14, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/14/examiners-begin-issuing-alice-rej
ections-for-software/id=50412/.
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this may seem like a step towards a solution, it is actually a step
towards invalidating all software patents, which can ultimately
preempt the idea of monopolizing a creative idea for the purposes of
innovation.
2. What Next?
Similar to abolishing software patents, the current state of
patentable subject matter has not strengthened the case for software
patents. Courts are invalidating software patents because they just
implement an idea in a computer, which is not enough to satisfy
patentability. One can say, however, the same about every software
system created. The idea of the computer was to make a process
faster and more efficient, even if that meant transferring human skill
sets into computer-implemented instructions. The Supreme Court is
saying that it needs more than just transferring an ordinary skill; it
needs something creative, something new and useful.
Alice has established a threshold that goes beyond the Court's
opinion. The two-part test, although it institutes a framework to
determine software patentability, induces ambiguities that will remain
on a case-by-case basis. The concept of innovation is to move
forward, and one cannot move forward without the incentive to
invent technological processes that modernize the virtual world we
live in today.
Allowing society to patent software is where Congress and the
PTO play a prominent role. Congress must define a software patent
in the patent system and should differentiate computer-implemented
instructions from computerized processes that add new and useful
technology to society. This leads the USPTO to establish a more
stringent patent application process for software patents that places
the burden on the patent applicant to prove how their invention
provides an additional technical advancement. The USPTO should
practice software patentability similar to the one adopted in the EPO
and JPO. Although the USPTO has already begun to reject and
invalidate software patents, there is no clear and distinguishable basis
for doing so aside from the Alice standard.
Making software patents more difficult to obtain consequently
threatens patent monetizers from bringing their current software
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patents to court with the fear that they will be invalidated. The patent
system should allow software patents to the extent that it encourages
new ideas and inventions, but not to the extent that it allows patent
trolls to obtain broad patents on everyday office equipment that
affects startups, small business, and entrepreneurship. Incorporating
in the statute the definition of software patents and its extent of
patentability as well as establishing a process similar to the Japanese
and European patent system will bring solace to this discussion and
allow the furtherance of innovation and entrepreneurship by limiting
patent troll litigation.
D. LEGISLATURE: IT TAKES MORE THAN THE SUPREME COURT TO
DECIDE
Throughout this note I have argued that it would take more
than the Supreme Court decision in Alice to define and interpret
software patentability; the legislature would need to create
boundaries for what is and is not patent eligible pursuant to § 101.
Justice Scalia would undoubtedly argue that the legislature is more
suited to tailor to the needs of society, and that is the argument I set
forth.
Unlike the Supreme Court, the legislature is a democracy that
represents what the people want in a current area of law. State
representatives and members of Congress are better versed in the
subject matter than a Supreme Court Justice who is deciding on the
merits. They also have more resources and may go beyond the merits
to enact legislation that can adopt the technological advancements
and reinforce the strengths of small companies and startups. This
debate goes beyond issues of law; they are policy issues that society as
well as members of the government have begun to see as a threat.
The ambiguities in software patenting have reinforced patent troll
attacks and impeded the continuous urge for America to prosper and
grow through advances in technology. The legislature must accept
that the companies and people inventing are the startups based in
Silicon Valley and other tech hubs; they need funding and support but
that will not be possible with the current state of the patent system.
Although Alice has spearheaded a new era in patentability,
which has magnified the problem in the lower courts, it is not the
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Supreme Court that will instill this change in society, but rather, it will
take legislative knowledge and active public policy to help startup
companies and entrepreneurs drive innovation.
E. DEFENSE TACTICS: PROTECTING EMERGING COMPANIES FROM
PATENT TROLLS
Patent reform and reevaluating software patenting are
solutions that take time, money, and legislative support. For short-
term effects, emerging companies should consider certain defense
tactics to protect themselves from patent troll attacks.
In a recent article, Colleen V. Chien proposed the idea of
identifying the most threatening patents ahead of time in order to
reduce the risk of patent assertion. 63 Software patents are the riskiest
patents. It can be determined whether a patent is going to be litigated
depending on the economic value of the patent, the characteristics of
the owner of the patent, and the propensity to litigate. 164 Software
patents are more likely to be litigated because they are economically
valuable; software patents are usually infringed by startup companies,
and they are asserted by large and wealthy patent trolls who are
inclined to litigate.
There are several defense tactics for startups to protect
themselves from potential litigation and be less vulnerable to patent
troll attacks. Because startup companies are susceptible targets,
"spreading information, risks and costs, the transaction costs and thus
the return on trolling, can be reduced." '65 Smaller companies are the
ones innocently using technology rather than creating it. Many of
these patents asserted on startup companies are invalid, but
determining validity is very costly. "Royalty-based settlements"
should be imposed when small companies "legitimize" patents held
by patent monetizers in order for the small company to increase its
return on the patent assertion.166
Several advocates and software patent war veterans have also
163. Chien, supra note 21, at 328.
164. Id.
165. Chien, supra note I1, at 4.
166. Chien, supra note 120, at 485.
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started campaigning and raising awareness. Establishing a platform to
upload demand letters, discuss asserted patents, and create a laundry
list of patent monetizers attacking small companies and startups will
help ameliorate the harm. TrollingEffects.org is an online platform
created by a San Francisco digital-privacy group and has posted about
fifty demand letters over the past year.167 Other companies such as
Lex Machina, a legal analytics company, has created a free tool,
"Demand Letter Analytics," for small companies to search the
company that send the demand letter along with prior actions from
the company, cases that go to trial, and damage fees. 168 Similarly,
RPX Corporation provides RPX Search and "Assertion Letter
Management" free of charge to learn more about the patent asserted
and other necessary legal information.1 69 The USPTO has accepted
the threat and harm patent trolls have been causing and has itself
linked TrollingEffects.org as a resource on their website.
Exposing emerging companies to risks associated with using
technology can help fight off patent trolls in the short-term. Law firms
directing emerging companies have slowly implemented guides for
startup companies to be more in sync with the patent system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Founding Fathers incorporated patent protection rights
that grant a limited monopoly on inventions. Their assumption was
that this provision would encourage innovation, increase research and
development, promote entrepreneurship, and help the economy
flourish. When this provision was implemented in the Constitution,
however, the advancement of technology and the creation of patent
monetization entities was not predicted.
Patent litigation asserted by patent monetization entities (i.e.,
patent trolls) has grown drastically since 2007. The effects of litigation
target startup companies that are still in the process of growing and
prospering, but patent troll attacks have not only affected startup
167. Angus Loten & Ruth Simon, A New Tool in the Battle Against Patent Trolls: Shame,
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companies financially but more importantly, hindered innovation and
entrepreneurship. Most of these patent assertions are software
patents that may be arbitrary, vague, and broad. The threat of
asserting software patents leads startups and small companies to pay
patent licensing fees to avoid costly litigation or potential dilution.
Patentability of software patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101 remains
obscure, but eliminating them all together would not resolve the
problem either. The intent of pursuing bright-line rules for
patentable subject matters is to encourage optimal innovation.
Startup companies drive innovation and entrepreneurship, and
allowing patent trolls to disrupt new inventions and the process of
technological advancements affects the concept of monopolizing
patents under the Constitution.
Regardless of the decision the Supreme Court made in Alice
and its aftermath, patent reform will require the legislature to define
patentability because it has the resources and knowledge that will
tailor to societal needs. Congress should adopt ideas from the
European and Japanese patent system in determining the limitations
on software patent eligibility and define a software patent that is new,
useful, and takes a step towards an inventive process. Similar to the
European patent system, Congress must also lay out those ideas that
are not patent eligible such as a mathematical formulas, scientific
theories, and computer programs. Although these issues have been
argued in the courts, each decision focuses on a particular case rather
than the underlying problems that bring these disputes to court.
While biotech and medical device patents are considered higher
quality patents, Congress, when implementing a new patent system
for software, must encourage stringent guidelines for software
patentability. The concept of establishing a "triadic patent" for
software would allow the USPTO to impose strict standards for
patentability and the burden would be placed on the inventor to
prove what distinguishes its idea from an abstract one. This goes
beyond the concept of physicality and focuses on the application of
the invention.
The increases in technological innovation have expanded the
ideas of applying a process to create a product, and consequently,
startup companies are leading the new technology era. Defining
patent eligible subject matter under § 101 will allow startup
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companies to keep inventing and entrepreneurs to keep investing.
Most importantly, it will help eliminate patent trolls from targeting
the vulnerable minority.
